"Miscellanies" No. 1352 & No. 1360
I am grateful to Dr. Garry Williams, Oak Hill Theological College, London, for opening up a discussion concerning the meaning of a passage in Edwards’ final entry in the “Miscellanies.” In this note I am just setting out my own thoughts on how to read the passage - Dr Williams is cordially invited to offer his own views or response if he has time.
The passage (which is the seventeenth stage in a twenty point argument) reads like this:
‘Then the union of the patron has its measure and proportion according to the rule now mentioned, and so is sufficient to answer his whole interest, when the degree of his regard to the client’s interest stands in the same proportion to his regard to his own personal interest, as the degree of the capacity of the client stands in to the degree of his own capacities. For the degrees of capacity are as the greatness or the degrees of existence of the persons.’ (The “Miscellanies” No. 1360, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, The “Miscellanies” 1153-1360 edited by Douglas A. Sweeney (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). 715. Hereafter Works, 23, page number.)
This marks a turning point in Edwards’ argument and is important for understanding his general case for the transfer of merit – or imputation. Like many parts of JE it is sufficiently complicated to turn off many of his readers. What did you make of the extract?
So let me take a step back – actually a number of steps back. I want to offer a reading of this paragraph that explains it in the context of the essay in which it is located (two “Miscellanies” entries, Nos. 1352 and 1360. I refer to these two entries as one essay by JE).
No. 1352 CHRIST’S SATISFACTION OR ATONEMENT, ETC & No. 1360 OF SUBSTITUTION AND IMPUTATION OF MERIT
The background to this entry is Edwards’ engagement with Socinian objections to substitutionary interpretations of the atonement. He cites Socinus at 23, 485 and begins the discussion with a number of biblical examples of the transfer of demerit and a note to himself to ‘search the Concordance for other places’ (23, 484).
The entry develops with this statement (23, 482):
‘By this it appears that a mediator’s putting himself in the stead of the offender, so that the offended party should impute it to him, and look on the mediator as having taken it upon him, looking on him as the debtor of what satisfaction should be required and expected, was in those days no strange notion, as a thing in itself absurd and inconsistent with men’s natural notions of things.’
His point is that the exchange of merit/demerit was in line with ‘men’s natural notions of things.’ Again he says ‘[t]he translation of guilt or obligation to punishment was not a thing alien from men’s conceptions and notions of old in Scripture times, neither the times of the old testament or new (23, 484).’
The bulk of the essay develops as an exposition of the ‘reasonableness’ of the ‘doctrine of the imputation of merit’ (23,486). There are twenty steps in the argument.
He begins by defining three of his key terms: merit, patron, and client. Merit here being the ‘recommendation’ of one to another’s regard (23, 486). Then he defines patron and client: the former is one ‘of superior dignity or merit that stands for and espouses the interest of another, interposes between him and a third person or party in that capacity, to secure, maintain, or promote the interest of that other by his influence with him, improving his merit with him, or interest in his esteem and regard for that end (23,486).
The client is that other person ‘whose interest the patron thus espouses’ (23,487).
Throughout the argument Christ is the patron (theological term = mediator) and the client is the Christian for whom Christ merits righteousness. Edwards never states this – because this is merely an argument for the general reasonableness of imputation – but that is the background.
1. First, patronage per se is not unreasonable, nor contrary to nature (23,487).
2. Next, patronage reasonably involves imputation (23,487). This is also reasonable – as in the case of child that is esteemed for the sake of the parents.
3. This imputation is based on relation or union. This is what he is focusing on in the essay – the nature of an appropriate or fitting union. In particular, when the Patron is of far greater dignity that the Client (23,488).
4. If the P. and C. may be taken as ‘completely one and as it were the same’ then the P. may be substituted for the C. - his (P’s) merit can be substituted for the needs of the C. This union is based on the love that the P has for the C. ‘His love puts him thoroughly in the client’s stead’ (23, 488) See ref to No. 398 which is about union. When the love of the P is such that he is willing to be put in the place of C- and suffer calamity and destruction for the C. – then there is a sufficient relation for a complete union (23, 488).
5. Appropriateness of allowing one to desire the good of another – ‘For that good which anyone desires, sets his heart upon and seeks, thereby becomes his own good.’ By making the desired end his own he can substitute himself in the room of the other. [note also 20. below on the necessity of a mutual act from the C. accepting the substitution.]
6. This substitution is particularly appropriate when the P is willing to suffer at the expense of his own personal and private welfare (23, 489)
7. Works best when the P appeals directly to another (his ‘friend’ ie God the Father) ‘particularly and directly’ to ‘the person who has so high an esteem and affection for him.’ (the person is God, who looks on the merit of him ie Christ the patron) (23, 490).
8. Best when the P’s merit originates in a desire to merit good for the C. In other words the P performs acts ‘in seeking the good of the client.’ The merit only exists for the sake of the client (23, 490).
9. A moral good is added to the natural good when the ‘worthiness of the patron and the value expended are offered, both together in one, as the price of the welfare of the client’ (23, 490).
10. This acceptance of the P’s merit will be more natural still to the extent that the P takes the (exact?) place of the C. – ‘takes his place in the universe’ (23, 490-491).
11. If the C has ill treated the person to whom the P will represent the C – then (God’s) ‘abating and dismissing resentment’ – ‘for the sake of the merit of the P’ – is the same ‘reward’ as the patron would have received for his personal merit in the case of no offence (23,491).
12. Nature of Union between P and C. IT MUST NOT VIOLATE THE WORTHINESS of the Patron nor affect the union between the P and the ‘friend’ whom he wishes to influence. That is to say, P’s union with C must not taint P’s personal virtue / merit or the relationship between P and friend (23, 491).
How can this union between P and C exist and the P not violate these rules? Ans: he must disapprove of the acts of C that brought the need for P’s merit. P must honor the rule of virtue.
13. When we ask – can the merit of P suffice for C ? – the DIGNITY of P’s person is one element that must be placed in the scales – (move to 23, 713) along with the DEGREE OF FAVOR SOUGHT.
At this point we plunge into the more complex discussion –
In 13. JE states that it is possible for the merit of P to be a ‘perfect sufficiency’ for ‘all the favor that the client needs.’ This will happen when the dignity of P’s person and the ‘degree of the patron’s union with his client’ is ‘sufficient to countervail all the favor that the client needs.’ Actually, what he is arguing for is a situation where P has infinite dignity, and the union between the two is sufficient that this merit can be transferred to the C.
From this point on he is trying to explain this – particularly how these distinct ideas relate together.
14. If the P and C are equals (as to greatness of being or degree of existence) and the degree of union is such that P treats C’s needs as his own then the result is a strict union in which the interests of the client become the interest of the P.
This is just a principle that he wants to set out but it does not apply to the argument he is making. He is simply saying that a strict union is necessary between to equals. He now moves on to discuss how such a union could exist between unequals.
(in the last para of 14 JE raises an issue – ‘the impropriety or unfitness of the union’ – but he doesn’t come back to it.)
15. If the patron and client are not equal (14 was only illustrative), but P is vastly greater, then this gives greater weight to the union – in terms of influence with P’s friend. So that a lesser degree of union of the patron with his client may be equivalent to a greater union in case of equality.
16. In order to judge the sufficiency of the union : two aspects: 1. degree of union and 2. degree of greatness (of P over C as in 15.) So that ‘the patron’s union with the client shall be such that, considering jointly both the degree of greatness and the degree of union the patron’s union with his client shall be as considerable and weighty, and have as much influence, as if in a case of equality of the patron with his client the union between them was so great that the patron’s regard to the welfare of the client were equal with his regard to his own’ (23, 714-715).
What does he mean? In order for the union to be sufficient (between a greater P and a lesser C) there must be a union the same as (‘as if’) the P and C were equals – a perfect/ strict union. And this means a calculus based on the degree of difference between P and C and the degree of union.
So what sort of union is sufficient?
17. There will be a sufficiency in the union when:
P’s regard to the C’s interest
stands in the same proportion to his own regard for his personal interest
as
‘the degree of the capacity of the client stands in to the degree of his own capacities.’
What is the client’s capacity? Capacity equals the need which the C. has - in other words, the ‘favor that the client needs’ or his missing merit / demerit. (see the very first line of No. 1360 where he writes of ‘the degree of favor sought.’ This is, I think, what he means by capacity.)
So the ‘the degree of the capacity of the client stands in to the degree of his own (ie P’s) capacities’ means the merit needed by the CLIENT (ie his need of favor) compared with the favor (or merit) of P.
So there will be ‘sufficiency in the patron’s union’ when the P regards (ie loves) C’s welfare (need of favor / merit ) in the same proportion as he regards his own welfare --- and this proportion EQUALS the capacity of the client in relation to the capacity of the P.
18. JE then explains this in the following way – the correct proportion exists when ‘P regards the client’s interest as his own, according to the C’s capacity.’
This a way round the problem that might be raised because P is so much greater than C. How can he assume the C’s interest as his own when it appears so insignificant to P’s greatness? The P’s capacity far outstretches the C.
The answer is that it may represent a total need on the part of the Client (in his own terms, his own capacity, degree of existence) and so a union requires this proportional interest from P – he must be totally concerned for the needs of P even as he would normally be totally concerned for his own needs.
And as JE goes on to say in 18: this may mean that the P loves the C as a lesser member – but he is loving himself (ie his own interest) even if it appears (strictly considered) a much lesser concern. This total proportionate loving regard for C’s interest from P results in C becoming a part of P’s body.
This allows JE to establish a union between a greater and a lesser. If love equates with regarding another’s interests as your own it is hard to see how the greater can love the lesser – and without love there is no union. The answer is that the P loves the C in a proportionately appropriate way. So when he said in 4. (above) :
4. If the P. and C. may be taken as ‘completely one and as it were the same’ then the P. may be substituted for the C. and his (P’s) merit can be substituted for the needs of the C. This union is based on the love that the P has for the C. ‘His love puts him thoroughly in the client’s stead’ (23, 488)
This is what he is seeking to establish – the love that P has for C – P really does love C as he loves his own interests. There is a sufficient union and therefore there is a reasonable transfer of merit.
19. This love of P for C’s interest is properly tested by suffering
20. According to the nature of things the union must be mutual - C must embrace P. C must express an ‘entire approbation of the benefits which the patron seeks of his friend for the client’ (23, 716).
Back then to the gobbet that I began with:
‘Then the union of the patron has its measure and proportion according to the rule now mentioned, and so is sufficient to answer his whole interest, when the degree of his regard to the client’s interest stands in the same proportion to his regard to his own personal interest, as the degree of the capacity of the client stands in to the degree of his own capacities. For the degrees of capacity are as the greatness or the degrees of existence of the persons’ (23, 715).
JE is seeking to explain the nature of act of the patron that is necessary to create a sufficient union between the (greater) Patron and the (lesser) Client. What is the necessary ‘measure and proportion’ of a sufficient union? Will the union be sufficient to result in a transfer of merit that will provide for the Client’s ‘whole interest’?
Answer: A sufficient union will exist when the P regards / loves the Client in the same proportion as his own interest – according to the degree of capacity or greatness of the person.
In other words, the Patron has a regard for his own personal interest appropriate to his own dignity – he has a total regard for his own vastly greater dignity (15.) In order for a union to exist he must regard the (lesser) personal interest of the client in the same way that he regards his own personal interest. He must do this proportionately according to the capacity or degree of person of the client. Although the regard will be lesser in absolute terms (18. he is loving a ‘finger’ not an ‘head’) yet in proportionate terms he will love the (lesser) client as he does himself.
The result of this is a strict union between the P and the C that results in a transfer of the P’s merit to the C.
The passage (which is the seventeenth stage in a twenty point argument) reads like this:
‘Then the union of the patron has its measure and proportion according to the rule now mentioned, and so is sufficient to answer his whole interest, when the degree of his regard to the client’s interest stands in the same proportion to his regard to his own personal interest, as the degree of the capacity of the client stands in to the degree of his own capacities. For the degrees of capacity are as the greatness or the degrees of existence of the persons.’ (The “Miscellanies” No. 1360, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, The “Miscellanies” 1153-1360 edited by Douglas A. Sweeney (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). 715. Hereafter Works, 23, page number.)
This marks a turning point in Edwards’ argument and is important for understanding his general case for the transfer of merit – or imputation. Like many parts of JE it is sufficiently complicated to turn off many of his readers. What did you make of the extract?
So let me take a step back – actually a number of steps back. I want to offer a reading of this paragraph that explains it in the context of the essay in which it is located (two “Miscellanies” entries, Nos. 1352 and 1360. I refer to these two entries as one essay by JE).
No. 1352 CHRIST’S SATISFACTION OR ATONEMENT, ETC & No. 1360 OF SUBSTITUTION AND IMPUTATION OF MERIT
The background to this entry is Edwards’ engagement with Socinian objections to substitutionary interpretations of the atonement. He cites Socinus at 23, 485 and begins the discussion with a number of biblical examples of the transfer of demerit and a note to himself to ‘search the Concordance for other places’ (23, 484).
The entry develops with this statement (23, 482):
‘By this it appears that a mediator’s putting himself in the stead of the offender, so that the offended party should impute it to him, and look on the mediator as having taken it upon him, looking on him as the debtor of what satisfaction should be required and expected, was in those days no strange notion, as a thing in itself absurd and inconsistent with men’s natural notions of things.’
His point is that the exchange of merit/demerit was in line with ‘men’s natural notions of things.’ Again he says ‘[t]he translation of guilt or obligation to punishment was not a thing alien from men’s conceptions and notions of old in Scripture times, neither the times of the old testament or new (23, 484).’
The bulk of the essay develops as an exposition of the ‘reasonableness’ of the ‘doctrine of the imputation of merit’ (23,486). There are twenty steps in the argument.
He begins by defining three of his key terms: merit, patron, and client. Merit here being the ‘recommendation’ of one to another’s regard (23, 486). Then he defines patron and client: the former is one ‘of superior dignity or merit that stands for and espouses the interest of another, interposes between him and a third person or party in that capacity, to secure, maintain, or promote the interest of that other by his influence with him, improving his merit with him, or interest in his esteem and regard for that end (23,486).
The client is that other person ‘whose interest the patron thus espouses’ (23,487).
Throughout the argument Christ is the patron (theological term = mediator) and the client is the Christian for whom Christ merits righteousness. Edwards never states this – because this is merely an argument for the general reasonableness of imputation – but that is the background.
1. First, patronage per se is not unreasonable, nor contrary to nature (23,487).
2. Next, patronage reasonably involves imputation (23,487). This is also reasonable – as in the case of child that is esteemed for the sake of the parents.
3. This imputation is based on relation or union. This is what he is focusing on in the essay – the nature of an appropriate or fitting union. In particular, when the Patron is of far greater dignity that the Client (23,488).
4. If the P. and C. may be taken as ‘completely one and as it were the same’ then the P. may be substituted for the C. - his (P’s) merit can be substituted for the needs of the C. This union is based on the love that the P has for the C. ‘His love puts him thoroughly in the client’s stead’ (23, 488) See ref to No. 398 which is about union. When the love of the P is such that he is willing to be put in the place of C- and suffer calamity and destruction for the C. – then there is a sufficient relation for a complete union (23, 488).
5. Appropriateness of allowing one to desire the good of another – ‘For that good which anyone desires, sets his heart upon and seeks, thereby becomes his own good.’ By making the desired end his own he can substitute himself in the room of the other. [note also 20. below on the necessity of a mutual act from the C. accepting the substitution.]
6. This substitution is particularly appropriate when the P is willing to suffer at the expense of his own personal and private welfare (23, 489)
7. Works best when the P appeals directly to another (his ‘friend’ ie God the Father) ‘particularly and directly’ to ‘the person who has so high an esteem and affection for him.’ (the person is God, who looks on the merit of him ie Christ the patron) (23, 490).
8. Best when the P’s merit originates in a desire to merit good for the C. In other words the P performs acts ‘in seeking the good of the client.’ The merit only exists for the sake of the client (23, 490).
9. A moral good is added to the natural good when the ‘worthiness of the patron and the value expended are offered, both together in one, as the price of the welfare of the client’ (23, 490).
10. This acceptance of the P’s merit will be more natural still to the extent that the P takes the (exact?) place of the C. – ‘takes his place in the universe’ (23, 490-491).
11. If the C has ill treated the person to whom the P will represent the C – then (God’s) ‘abating and dismissing resentment’ – ‘for the sake of the merit of the P’ – is the same ‘reward’ as the patron would have received for his personal merit in the case of no offence (23,491).
12. Nature of Union between P and C. IT MUST NOT VIOLATE THE WORTHINESS of the Patron nor affect the union between the P and the ‘friend’ whom he wishes to influence. That is to say, P’s union with C must not taint P’s personal virtue / merit or the relationship between P and friend (23, 491).
How can this union between P and C exist and the P not violate these rules? Ans: he must disapprove of the acts of C that brought the need for P’s merit. P must honor the rule of virtue.
13. When we ask – can the merit of P suffice for C ? – the DIGNITY of P’s person is one element that must be placed in the scales – (move to 23, 713) along with the DEGREE OF FAVOR SOUGHT.
At this point we plunge into the more complex discussion –
In 13. JE states that it is possible for the merit of P to be a ‘perfect sufficiency’ for ‘all the favor that the client needs.’ This will happen when the dignity of P’s person and the ‘degree of the patron’s union with his client’ is ‘sufficient to countervail all the favor that the client needs.’ Actually, what he is arguing for is a situation where P has infinite dignity, and the union between the two is sufficient that this merit can be transferred to the C.
From this point on he is trying to explain this – particularly how these distinct ideas relate together.
14. If the P and C are equals (as to greatness of being or degree of existence) and the degree of union is such that P treats C’s needs as his own then the result is a strict union in which the interests of the client become the interest of the P.
This is just a principle that he wants to set out but it does not apply to the argument he is making. He is simply saying that a strict union is necessary between to equals. He now moves on to discuss how such a union could exist between unequals.
(in the last para of 14 JE raises an issue – ‘the impropriety or unfitness of the union’ – but he doesn’t come back to it.)
15. If the patron and client are not equal (14 was only illustrative), but P is vastly greater, then this gives greater weight to the union – in terms of influence with P’s friend. So that a lesser degree of union of the patron with his client may be equivalent to a greater union in case of equality.
16. In order to judge the sufficiency of the union : two aspects: 1. degree of union and 2. degree of greatness (of P over C as in 15.) So that ‘the patron’s union with the client shall be such that, considering jointly both the degree of greatness and the degree of union the patron’s union with his client shall be as considerable and weighty, and have as much influence, as if in a case of equality of the patron with his client the union between them was so great that the patron’s regard to the welfare of the client were equal with his regard to his own’ (23, 714-715).
What does he mean? In order for the union to be sufficient (between a greater P and a lesser C) there must be a union the same as (‘as if’) the P and C were equals – a perfect/ strict union. And this means a calculus based on the degree of difference between P and C and the degree of union.
So what sort of union is sufficient?
17. There will be a sufficiency in the union when:
P’s regard to the C’s interest
stands in the same proportion to his own regard for his personal interest
as
‘the degree of the capacity of the client stands in to the degree of his own capacities.’
What is the client’s capacity? Capacity equals the need which the C. has - in other words, the ‘favor that the client needs’ or his missing merit / demerit. (see the very first line of No. 1360 where he writes of ‘the degree of favor sought.’ This is, I think, what he means by capacity.)
So the ‘the degree of the capacity of the client stands in to the degree of his own (ie P’s) capacities’ means the merit needed by the CLIENT (ie his need of favor) compared with the favor (or merit) of P.
So there will be ‘sufficiency in the patron’s union’ when the P regards (ie loves) C’s welfare (need of favor / merit ) in the same proportion as he regards his own welfare --- and this proportion EQUALS the capacity of the client in relation to the capacity of the P.
18. JE then explains this in the following way – the correct proportion exists when ‘P regards the client’s interest as his own, according to the C’s capacity.’
This a way round the problem that might be raised because P is so much greater than C. How can he assume the C’s interest as his own when it appears so insignificant to P’s greatness? The P’s capacity far outstretches the C.
The answer is that it may represent a total need on the part of the Client (in his own terms, his own capacity, degree of existence) and so a union requires this proportional interest from P – he must be totally concerned for the needs of P even as he would normally be totally concerned for his own needs.
And as JE goes on to say in 18: this may mean that the P loves the C as a lesser member – but he is loving himself (ie his own interest) even if it appears (strictly considered) a much lesser concern. This total proportionate loving regard for C’s interest from P results in C becoming a part of P’s body.
This allows JE to establish a union between a greater and a lesser. If love equates with regarding another’s interests as your own it is hard to see how the greater can love the lesser – and without love there is no union. The answer is that the P loves the C in a proportionately appropriate way. So when he said in 4. (above) :
4. If the P. and C. may be taken as ‘completely one and as it were the same’ then the P. may be substituted for the C. and his (P’s) merit can be substituted for the needs of the C. This union is based on the love that the P has for the C. ‘His love puts him thoroughly in the client’s stead’ (23, 488)
This is what he is seeking to establish – the love that P has for C – P really does love C as he loves his own interests. There is a sufficient union and therefore there is a reasonable transfer of merit.
19. This love of P for C’s interest is properly tested by suffering
20. According to the nature of things the union must be mutual - C must embrace P. C must express an ‘entire approbation of the benefits which the patron seeks of his friend for the client’ (23, 716).
Back then to the gobbet that I began with:
‘Then the union of the patron has its measure and proportion according to the rule now mentioned, and so is sufficient to answer his whole interest, when the degree of his regard to the client’s interest stands in the same proportion to his regard to his own personal interest, as the degree of the capacity of the client stands in to the degree of his own capacities. For the degrees of capacity are as the greatness or the degrees of existence of the persons’ (23, 715).
JE is seeking to explain the nature of act of the patron that is necessary to create a sufficient union between the (greater) Patron and the (lesser) Client. What is the necessary ‘measure and proportion’ of a sufficient union? Will the union be sufficient to result in a transfer of merit that will provide for the Client’s ‘whole interest’?
Answer: A sufficient union will exist when the P regards / loves the Client in the same proportion as his own interest – according to the degree of capacity or greatness of the person.
In other words, the Patron has a regard for his own personal interest appropriate to his own dignity – he has a total regard for his own vastly greater dignity (15.) In order for a union to exist he must regard the (lesser) personal interest of the client in the same way that he regards his own personal interest. He must do this proportionately according to the capacity or degree of person of the client. Although the regard will be lesser in absolute terms (18. he is loving a ‘finger’ not an ‘head’) yet in proportionate terms he will love the (lesser) client as he does himself.
The result of this is a strict union between the P and the C that results in a transfer of the P’s merit to the C.
posted by Michael McClenahan at 11:37:00 am
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